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Abstract
Why does residential investment lead output in the US and Canada but it is coinci-
dent in other industrialized countries? In this paper we explore the role of home-equity
loans used to boost consumption as a channel that affects residential investment. To-
wards this end, we consider a multi-agent real business cycle model augmented with
household borrowing constraints that reflect home-equity loans or refinancing con-
straints. The main contribution of our paper is to highlight that the severity of these
borrowing constraints in the economy can generate both stylized facts of residential
investment dynamics. In US and Canada, a greater proportion of households rely on
home-equity loans relative to other industrialized countries. This difference matters
for the distinct residential investment dynamics observed across countries.
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Of the components of GDP, residential investment offers by far the best early warning
sign of an oncoming recession - Leamer (2008)
1 Introduction
Residential investment in the housing sector has long been viewed as important for understanding
fluctuations in economic activity (Burns and Mitchell (1946)). More recently, Leamer (2008, 2015)
has noted that the decline of cumulative residential investment in recessions accounts for about
half of the overall decline in US GDP. In this context, two key stylized facts have been documented
in the literature: First, residential investment leads the business cycle in US and Canada. Second,
residential investment is coincident with the cycle in many other industrialized countries.1 Kydland
et al. (2014) present a model with long-term mortgage loans and multi-period time-to-build in
residential construction to account for these stylized facts. Kydland et al. (2014) model the loan
structure as ‘first mortgage’ loans and, therefore, does not capture an important source of financing
household consumption, namely, home-equity or refinancing loans. Recently, Gorea and Midrigan
(2015) note that mortgage refinancing accounts for about one-third of the rise and fall in household
spending during the 2001-2011 period.
In this paper we explicitly explore the role of home-equity loans to refinance consumption.
Towards this end, we consider a multi-agent real business cycle (RBC) model augmented with
household borrowing constraints that reflect home equity loans or refinancing constraints. The
main contribution of our paper is to highlight that the severity of these constraints in the economy
can generate both stylized facts of residential investment dynamics as described above.
We show that residential investment leads output by one quarter when the fraction of house-
holds who face borrowing constraints is matched to US data. In European countries, the share
of households facing borrowing constraints is, on average, relatively smaller than the US, which
according to the model implies that residential investment is coincident with the cycle. There are
two incentives for purchasing larger quantity of houses. First, housing services directly enter the
1Fisher (2007) studies a separate stylized fact of why might residential investment lead non-residential
investment over the business cycle in the US. He emphasizes the complementarity of household capital—as
proxied by the size of house—to labour and capital in market production in accounting for this fact.
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workers’ utility function. Since the positive technology shock induces a wealth effect, they decide
to spend more on houses. However, this positive wealth effect alone is not sufficient to produce
the leading pattern. Second, workers are borrowing-constrained. The accumulation of the hous-
ing stock, therefore, allows them to borrow more contemporaneously and in future periods, so that
they are also able to consume greater quantities of the non-durable good. The household borrowing
constraint and its effect on residential investment is important in understanding the two prominent
stylized facts mentioned above.
Our paper is related to Ren and Yuan (2014) who attempt to explain why residential investment
leads the cycle in the US, using a partial equilibrium model with collateral constraints, agent
heterogeneity, and total factor productivity (TFP) news shocks. However, their model has the odd
implication that agents prefer to purchase houses instead of consumption goods after a positive
endowment shock. This is necessarily the case in their model because the mortgage interest rate is
lower than the credit card rate, both of which are calibrated parameters. In actual economies, even
though the mortgage rate is lower than the credit card rate, the use of credit card for consumer
goods purchases is common place. Moreover, their model cannot explain the stylized facts for other
industrialized countries.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes
the calibration of parameters. Section 4 presents the quantitative results and sensitivity analysis.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The model economy is populated by three categories of agents: workers, entrepreneurs and savers.
The share of each category is respectively ωW , ωE , and 1 − ωW − ωE . Agents are infinitely-
lived and maximize a discounted sum of time-separable utilities. We assume that workers and
entrepreneurs borrow from savers, therefore their discount factors, θW and θE , are lower than the
savers’ discount factor, β. Workers are employed by firms that produce non-durable goods and
2Another aspect that is ignored in the partial equilibrium setting of Ren and Yuan (2014) is that they do
not have the labour supply decision in the model. This assumption is not innocuous for TFP news shocks,
which are essential to their explanation, can produce wealth effects that mitigate business cycle comovements
(Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009)).
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houses — a durable good. They derive some utility from the consumption of non-durable goods
and housing services. Their loans are collateralized by the expected value of their stock of housing.
Entrepreneurs own both types of firms and make non-residential and residential investments. They
also face a borrowing constraint, as the value of their debt cannot exceed a fraction of their capital
stock. Finally, we assume that savers are risk-neutral agents whose only purpose is to channel funds
to the two other categories of agents. In the appendix, we present a fully detailed description of
the model’s stationary version.
2.1 Workers
The workers’ maximization problem is as follows:
E0
∞∑
t=0
θtW
(
ln cWt + ψ lnht + η ln
(
1− (n1+ct + n1+ht )1/(1+))) (1)
subject to
cWt + (1 + τh)qhtht − qht(1− δh)ht−1 = bHt −Ret−1bHt−1 + (1− τn)
∑
i=c,h
witnit + ξWt,(2)
bHt ≤ mHEtqht+1ht. (3)
Their period utility function is in logarithms and weighs their consumption of the non-durable
good, cWt, their housing stock, ht, and their leisure. The specification for leisure is not standard,
as we assume that the labor force is split up between the production of non-durable goods, nct, and
house production, nht. We follow Horvath (2000) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and allow for an
imperfect substitution of labor between sectors that is govern by . A greater value of  implies a
lower reshuﬄe of workers from one sector to another in response to wage differentials. Moreover, we
assume that mortgage debt carries a tax advantage such that interest payments can be deducted
from taxable income. Therefore, the effective interest rate Ret is R
e
t = 1 + rt(1 − τm) where rt is
the interest rate and τm corresponds to the fraction of deductible interest payments. We consider
adjustable rate mortgages, as they are renegotiated every period.
On the right-hand-side of their budget constraint, equation (2), impatient households have
different sources of revenues: (i) they earn labor income that is taxed at rate τn, so that their
total after-tax labor income is (1 − τn)
∑
i=c,hwitnit where wages wit are taken as given, (ii) they
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borrow bHt at the effective interest rate R
e
t , so that net borrowing is bHt − Ret−1bHt−1, and (iii)
they receive transfers from the government: ξWt. The left-hand-side consists in expenditures that
these households have, (i) for the consumption of non-durable goods, and (ii) the accumulation of
housing stock from which a fraction τh is taxed.
The second constraint, equation (3), is a collateral constraint. Specifically, the level of debt
contracted every period cannot exceed a fraction mH of the expected value of the households’ stock
of housing, i.e. Etqht+1ht. Since impatient households have a lower discount factor, this constraint
is binding in the steady state. We consider small shocks and a sufficiently low discount factor so
that it is also always binding in the neighborhood of the steady state.
2.2 Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneurs maximize the following problem:
E0
∞∑
t=0
θtE ln cEt (4)
subject to
cEt + xct + stpst = st−1(dt + pst) + bKt −Rt−1bKt−1 + (1− τk)rctkct−1 + pltlt + ξEt, (5)
xct = kct − (1− δc)kct−1, (6)
bKt ≤ mKkct. (7)
where cEt corresponds to the entrepreneurs’ consumption of non-durable goods.
3 They also invest
in the capital used for the production of these goods, xct. Note that there is no accumulation of
these structures as they are sold entirely every period, contrary to the capital used in the production
of non-durable goods, kct, for which there is an accumulation every period determined by equation
(26). Additionally, they decide how much equity shares, st to own. The revenues of entrepreneurs
are shown in the right-hand-side of equation (25). First, since they own the firms, they receive
dividend payments, dtst−1. Second, firms pay a rental rate rct to use capital, kct−1. Their capital
revenue income is taxed at rate τk. Third, investors are also endowed with lt acreage in land every
period that they sell to firms at price plt. Fourth, since they have a lower discount factor, they
3For simplicity, we assume that they do not work nor do they own houses.
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borrow bKt at the interest rate Rt, so that their net borrowing is bKt − Rt−1bKt−1. Fifth, they
receive governmental transfers ξEt. Similar to workers, entrepreneurs face a borrowing constraint,
equation (27), that states that they cannot borrow more than a fixed fraction mK of their capital
stock.
2.3 Savers
Savers are risk-neutral unconstrained agents who lend to workers and investors. Since their discount
factor is greater than discount factors of the two other categories of agents, they are savers in the
economy. Their maximization problem is as follows:
∞∑
t=0
βtcSt (8)
subject to
cSt =
1
1− ωW − ωE [ωW (Rt−1bHt−1 − bHt) + ωE (Rt−1bKt−1 − bKt)] . (9)
where cSt corresponds to the consumption of savers. Since we assume that categories of agents can
have different shares in the total population, the total amount lent to workers and entrepreneurs
corresponds to
ωW
1− ωW − ωE bHt and
ωE
1− ωW − ωE bKt.
2.4 Firms and production
Firms operate in a perfectly competitive market to produce non-durable goods, yt, and houses, ht.
They maximize the expected of the future dividend stream paid to entrepreneurs by picking the
levels of dividends, capital, labor, and land, as described as follows:
E0
∞∑
t=0
mtdt
subject to
dt +
∑
i=c,h
witnit + rctkct−1 + kbt + pltlt = yt + qtiht,
yt = ztk
αC
ct−1
(
ωW
ωE
nct
)1−αC
,
iht = ztk
αB
bt l
αL
t
(
ωW
ωE
nht
)1−αB−αL
.
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where mt corresponds to the stochastic discount factor that is taken exogenously by firms. New
houses are denoted by iht and intermediate inputs by kbt that refer to materials used in the con-
struction of houses. From the entrepreneurs’ first order condition with respect to equity shares, st,
mt = (θE)
t cE0
cEt
.4 Every period, the firms pay dividends and factors of production from the sale of
non-durable goods and houses. The labor inputs have to be adjusted to account for the difference
in population shares between workers and entrepreneurs. We assume that both production func-
tions are Cobb-Douglas and that neutral technology, zt, enters both of them. This shock follows
an AR(1) process:
ln zt = ρ ln zt−1 + t, t ∼ N(0, σ2) (10)
where ρ corresponds to the persistence parameter and σ2 to the variance of the innovation.
2.5 Government
In this economy, the government does not play any productive role. It levies distortionary taxes
on workers and entrepreneurs and makes lump-sum transfers, so that the total value of transfers
corresponds exactly to the amount that these two categories of agents pay in taxes:
ξWt = τn
∑
i=c,h
witnit + τhqhtht − rtτm, (11)
ξEt = τk[rctkct−1 + pbtkbt]. (12)
2.6 Market clearing conditions
There is a resource constraint in the economy, so that output corresponds to the sum of consumption
and investment:
yt =
∑
i=W,E,S
cit + xct + kbt. (13)
Additionally, the law of motion for houses is as follows:
iht = ht − (1− δH)ht−1. (14)
4Specifically, from the entrepreneurs’ first order condition with respect to equity shares, st, pst =
θEcEtEt
pst+1 + dt+1
cEt+1
. By forward substitution, pst = Et
∑∞
j=1
(
θjEcEt
cEt+j
)
dt+j . The firms’ stochastic dis-
count factor needs to be consistent with how equity prices discount future dividends.
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We assume that land supply is equal to one for all periods.5
3 Calibration
Table 1 shows the calibration of the baseline model. A study by the IMF (2011) approximates the
share of households with a mortgage to be 45 percent in 2004-05 for the US. In the economy, we
choose to have the same share of workers that are borrowing-constrained, i.e. ωW = 0.45. From
the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) report that the percentage
of business owners in the population is 9.1 percent, therefore we set ωE = 0.09. The value of the
savers’ quarterly discount factor is set so that the real interest rate is 3 percent in the steady state.
Since workers and entrepreneurs are borrowing-constrained, they face a shadow cost of borrowing
in addition to interest payments. This cost can be considered as an interest premium. Similar
to Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), we choose the impatient households’ discount factor to
match a two percent interest premium, i.e. θW = θE = 0.973. For a reasonable size of the TFP
shock, this value of the discount factor ensures that the borrowing constraint is always binding.
The weight on housing in the impatient’s household utility function is governed by ψ and is
set to match the average mortgage debt to GDP ratio in the US from 1984 to 2014, i.e. 2.79.
The weight assigned to leisure, η, is picked so that households work 30 percent of their allocated
time in the steady state. The parameter that governs the degree of sectoral labor mobility, , is
the only one that is determined outside the steady state. It is set to match the relative volatility
of residential investment to GDP. From the 2001 SCF data, Gorea and Midrigan (2015) find a
mean loan-to-value from all mortgage holders of 0.52, therefore we set mH = 0.52. As for the
entrepreneurs’ loan-to-value, mK , we pick a value so that the baseline model in the steady state
generates the same ratio of non-financial businesses debt securities and loans liabilities to GDP
from 1984 to 2014, i.e. 2.47.
Taxation distorts the decisions of workers and entrepreneurs. For labor and capital taxes, τn
and τk, we take the values estimated by Gomme and Rupert (2007) who use Mendoza et al. (1994)
methodology to calculate effective average tax rates. We set the property tax rate, τh = 0.025,
5In similar fashion to Davis and Heatcote (2005), we do not model land dynamics over the business cycle.
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TABLE 1: Calibration of the baseline model
Population
ωW 0.45 fraction of workers
ωE 0.09 fraction of entrepreneurs
Discount factors, preferences and loan-to-values
β 0.9925 discount factor (savers)
θW 0.973 discount factor (workers)
θE 0.973 discount factor (entrepreneurs)
ψ 0.55 weight on housing (workers)
η 1.92 weight on leisure (workers)
 0.25 sectoral labor mobility
mH 0.52 workers’ loan-to-value
mK 0.49 entrepreneurs’ loan-to-value
Taxation
τn 0.22 labor income tax
τk 0.29 capital tax
τh 0.025 property tax
τm 0.4 fraction of deductible mtg. interest payments
Depreciation, and technology
δm 0.025 dep. of capital
δh 0.004 dep. of housing
αC 0.36 el. wrt capital (non-durable goods)
αB 0.53 el. wrt material inputs (housing)
αL 0.1 el. wrt land (housing)
ρ 0.95 TFP persistence
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that is the value reported for the US by Girouard et al. (2006) in their survey of housing taxation
across OECD countries. Mortgage interest payments can be deducted from taxable income in the
US. We also follow Girouard et al. (2006) work, so that the after-income tax mortgage rate, τm,
corresponds to 60% of the real interest rate’s value.
The depreciation rate of capital is standard, i.e. δm = 0.025. We follow Gomme and Rupert
(2007) in computing the housing depreciation rate from BEA data and set δh = 0.004. We set the
capital share in the production of houses, αC = 0.36. We follow Davis and Heatcote (2005) and
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and set the share of land in the production of new houses to αL = 0.1.
In the production function of houses, we do not distinguish between capital in structures and
intermediate goods. Yet material costs compose a large share of total house production costs.
Specifically, in the US input-output tables from 1997 to 2014, this share is 15% greater than
workers’ compensation. We set αH to match this ratio to which we add a 10% share for structures
in similar fashion to the two studies aforementioned. Finally, we choose the persistence parameter
of the TFP shock, ρ = 0.95.
4 Quantitative results
In this section, we present the results for two different calibrations of the baseline model: one
that matches moments of the US data (values presented in Table 2) and another one for which
we lower the share of households that have mortgage debt (workers). A first set of results is that
the presence of borrowing constraints is critical to replicate the lead in residential investment and
many co-movements and relative volatilities for the United States that a standard RBC model fails
to deliver. Second, we show that when we lower the share of workers in the economy to the share
that prevailed in the euro zone, the lead in residential investment vanishes.
4.1 Benchmark calibration
In Table 2 we report the relative volatilities and co-movements of consumption, residential invest-
ment, non-residential investment, hours worked in construction and in other sectors, and housing
prices. We have set the degree of sector labor mobility measured by  to match the relative standard
deviation of residential investment, so we have imposed the model to match this moment. How-
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TABLE 2: Baseline Model Properties
STATISTIC
U.S.
DATA
BENCHMARK
CALIBRATION
EUROZONE
MORTGAGE DEBT
(ωW = 0.2)
Co-movements
ρ(ct, yt) 0.89 0.94 0.95
ρ(kbt, yt) 0.6 0.74 0.97
ρ(xct, yt) 0.85 0.97 0.97
ρ(nht, yt) 0.8 0.77 0.97
ρ(nct, yt) 0.8 0.43 0.73
ρ(iht, yt) 0.59 0.76 0.97
ρ(qht, yt) 0.61 0.46 0.93
Relative volatilities
σc/σy 0.87 0.52 0.5
σkb/σy 6.74 6.77 6.07
σxc/σy 4.13 3.8 3.81
σkb/σxc 1.63 1.78 1.59
σnh/σy 5.25 4.62 4.26
σnc/σy 1.05 0.82 0.29
σih/σy 10.93 6.21 5.66
σqh/σy 3.54 0.62 0.43
Notes: The U.S. data spans from 1984Q1 to 2015Q1 (except for hours
worked series that start in 1985Q1). All series are logged and detrended
with the HP-filter (λ=1600). Data sources are in the appendix.
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ever, there are no restrictions on the values of all other moments. The model reproduces very well
the relative volatilities of non-residential investment and sectoral hours worked. Specifically, the
volatility of investment is significantly higher in the housing construction sector both in the data
and generated by the model. This success is shared with previous work, e.g. Davis and Heatcote
(2005), Kydland et al. (2014), and Fisher (2007), however, a standard RBC multi-sector as the
one exposed by Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991) fails at replicating this relative volatility. The
effects of borrowing constraints are not at work here — it is simply the consequence of a lower
depreciation rate of houses than capital used in the production of non-durable goods. In fact, the
effects of investing in housing production last longer with a lower depreciation rate.
Moreover, the hours worked in the housing production sector are more volatile than hours
worked in the production of non-durable goods. This result is simply due to the greater volatility
of the production of houses itself, which in return is related to durability of this category of goods.
Accounting for the high volatility of housing prices in the data remains a challenge for our model.
In the literature, it appears that technology shocks are not sufficient to explain the radical shifts
in housing prices. Finally, the model is able to replicate the positive co-movements in all aggregate
quantity variables as well as in housing prices.
In Figure 1, we present the cross-correlation functions between output and residential invest-
ment computed from the actual data and those generated by the benchmark model. Residential
investment leads output by one quarter. The one period lead generated by the model overshoots
its data counterpart, but the predictions for the remaining leads and lags are extremely accurate.
The impulse responses displayed in Figure 2 gives evidence of the borrowing constraint mech-
anism at play. There are two incentives for purchasing larger quantity of houses. First, housing
services directly enter the workers’ utility function. Since the positive technology shock induces
a wealth effect, they decide to spend more on houses. However, this positive wealth effect alone
is not sufficient to produce the leading pattern. The key characteristic is that these workers are
borrowing-constrained. Therefore, the accumulation of the housing stock allows them to borrow
more contemporaneously and in future periods, so that they are also able to consume greater
quantities of the non-durable good.
The increase in residential investment after a technology shock is much stronger than the in-
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Figure 1: Cross-correlation function between output and residential investment.
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Notes: Specifically, this function corresponds to the correlation between residential invest-
ment at time t + j and output at time t. The blue line corresponds to the correlations
generated by the benchmark model and the red line to the correlations estimated from US
data between 1984Q1 and 2015Q1. All series are logged and detrended with the HP-filter
(λ=1600).
crease in non-residential investment, since the demand for houses is greater than for non-durable
goods. Because the entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraint is also relaxed from the accumulation of
capital, however, the initial response of non-residential investment is remains positive. In subse-
quent periods, its response follows the one of output which explains the strong contemporaneous
correlation. As for hours worked, the reallocation from the non-durable sector to the housing sector
is stronger as a wage differential arises.
4.2 Eurozone calibration for household borrowing
After having stressed the role played by borrowing constraints for the lead of residential investment
for the US, we calibrate the financial frictions parameters to match the data of European countries.
As seen in the introduction, there is a high degree of heterogeneity across countries when we examine
12
Figure 2: Impulse responses to a one percent technology shock.
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Notes: In panel a, the dashed blue line corresponds to the response of residential invest-
ment and the solid red line to non-residential investment. In panel b, the solid green line
corresponds to output.
mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratios. According to the IMF (2011), in 2004-05, the share of households
that had a mortgage was 20 percent in the eurozone. This smaller share is the only parameter that
we re-calibrate relative to the benchmark calibration, i.e. ωW = 0.2.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a one percent technology shock: Eurozone calibration
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Notes: In panel a, the dashed blue line corresponds to the response of residential invest-
ment and the solid red line to non-residential investment. In panel b, the solid green line
corresponds to output.
We report the results in the fourth column of Table 2. Most relative volatilities are not affected
by the change in calibration. The two exceptions are the volatilities of the price of houses and the
hours worked for the production of non-durable goods. The incentives to build more houses are
lessened, simply because less households are facing borrowing constraints for which their houses
are used as collateral. Since the demand for houses is not as strong, the volatility of its relative
price is lower. For the same reason, the substitution of sectoral labor is reduced and non-residential
investment increases following the technology shock as shown by the initial response of nct in
Figure 3. Since the technology shock has similar effects for the production of non-durable goods
and houses, the aggregate quantity variables are strongly correlated. As a consequence, the lead
in residential investment vanishes as can be seen in Figure 4. This result is compatible with the
cross-correlation pattern estimated for France. In fact, the fit of the model is good.
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Figure 4: Cross-correlation between residential investment and output: Eurozone calibration
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
j
Notes: Specifically, this function corresponds to the correlation between residential invest-
ment at time t + j and output at time t. The blue line corresponds to the correlations
generated by the benchmark model and the red line to the correlations estimated from
French data between 1984Q1 and 2015Q1. All series are logged and detrended with the
HP-filter (λ=1600).
5 Conclusion
Residential investment leads the business cycle in the US and Canada. In other industrialized
countries, however, residential investment is coincident with the output. The main contribution
of this paper is to show that home-equity loans used for consumption can influence residential
investment dynamics in ways that can account for the stylized facts. We show that when a larger
proportion of households face borrowing constraints on home-equity loans, as in the US and Canada,
residential investment can lead the business cycle. If this proportion is relatively smaller, as in other
industrialized countries, residential investment becomes coincident with the output and no longer
serves as a leading indicator in the economy.
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A Data
A.1 US
The series for output, consumption, residential investment, and non-residential investment are from
NIPA, Table 1.1.3. New houses are from the US Bureau of Census, specifically this series “Housing
Starts: Total: New Privately Owned Housing Units Started. The hours worked series are from the
BLS, nht is the number of employees in the residential construction sector, whereas nct consists
in the difference between total employment and nht. The housing price index is constructed from
FRB data, following the decomposition proposed by Davis (2009), which is divided by the CPI
index from the BLS.
A.2 France
Data is from the Quarterly National Accounts published by the INSEE.
B The model equations
B.1 Workers
E0
∞∑
t=0
θtW
(
ln cWt + ψ lnht + η ln
(
1− (n1+ct + n1+ht )1/(1+))) (15)
subject to
cIt + (1 + τh)qhtht − qht(1− δh)ht−1 =
bHt −Ret−1bHt−1+
(1− τn)
∑
i=c,hwitnit + ξWt,
(16)
bHt ≤ mHEtqht+1ht, (17)
nt =
(
n1+ct + n
1+
ht
)1/(1+)
, (18)
Ret = 1 + rt(1− τm). (19)
First-order conditions
c Wt:
1
cWt
= λ1t (20)
b Ht:
λ1t − λ2t = θWRetEtλ1t+1 (21)
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h t:
qhtλ1t(1 + τh)−mHλ2tEtqht+1 = θW (1− δh)Etqht+1 + Ψ
ht
(22)
n it i=c,h:
λ1t(1− τn)wit = ηI
1− nt
(
nit
nt
)
(23)
B.2 Entrepreneurs
E0
∞∑
t=0
θtE ln cEt (24)
subject to
cEt + xct + stpst =
st−1(dt + pst) + bKt −Rt−1bKt−1+
(1− τk)rctkct−1 + pltlt + ξEt,
(25)
xct = kct − (1− δc)kct−1, (26)
bKt ≤ mKkct. (27)
First-order conditions
c Et:
1
cEt
= µ1t (28)
b Kt:
µ1t − µ2t = RtθEEtµ1t+1 (29)
k ct:
µ1t − µ2tmK = θEEt (µ1t+1(1− δc + (1− τk)rct+1)) (30)
s t:
µ1tpst = θEEtµ1t (dt+1 + pst+1) (31)
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B.3 Savers
∞∑
t=0
βt ln cSt (32)
subject to
cSt =
1
1− ωW − ωE [ωW (Rt−1bHt−1 − bHt) + ωE (Rt−1bKt−1 − bKt)] . (33)
First-order conditions
c St:
1
cSt
= χ1t (34)
b Ht and b Kt:
χ1t = βRtEtχ1t+1 (35)
B.4 Firms and production
E0
∞∑
t=0
mtdt
subject to
dt +
∑
i=c,h
witnit + rctkct−1 + pbtkbt + pltlt = yt + qtiht,
yt = ztk
αC
ct−1
(
ωW
ωE
nct
)1−αC
,
iht = ztk
αB
bt l
αL
t
(
ωW
ωE
nht
)1−αB−αL
.
First-order conditions
d t:
Etmt = ϑ1t (36)
n ct:
wct = (1− αC) yt
nct
(37)
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n ht:
wht = (1− αB − αL)qtiht
nht
(38)
k ct-1:
rct = αC
yt
kct−1
(39)
k bt:
pbt = αB
qtiht
kbt
(40)
l t:
pbt = αL
qtiht
lt
(41)
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